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NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT SPLIT 
BY 
CARL TOBIAS* 
Congress recently considered some proposals to split the Ninth Circuit, pro-
posals that could have far-reaching effects on the environment, public lands, 
and natural resources. This Article first looks at some of the recent develop-
ments in Congress, particularly the authorization of a national study com-
mission to examine the federal appeals courts. Professor Tobias predicts that 
the Ninth Circuit will be split during the next decade. He cautions against 
using political considerations to conduct legislative policymaking with re-
spect to thefederal courts. He suggests that those concerned about the environ-
ment gather reliable information and explore alternatives to circuit-splitting. 
If Congress decides to bifurcate the Circuit, he suggests that it examine how 
districts will be realigned, particularly in terms of concepts such as ecosys-
tems, endangered species habitats, wildlife corridors, or river drainages, and 
in terms of specific natural resources such as old growth forests, salmon, and 
grizzly bears. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Those concerned about the environment, public lands, and natural 
resources, as well as about the federal courts in the West and the nation, 
closely monitored the debate over a controversial proposal by the 104th 
Congress to split the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
In the initial session of the 104th Congress, the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee approved Senate Bill 956 (Proposal), a proposal which would have cre-
ated a new 1\velfth Circuit comprised of Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon, and Washington, leaving California, Hawaii, Guam, and 
the Northern Mariana Islands in the Ninth Circuit. 1 The Judiciary Commit-
tee decision was significant because no proposal for bifurcating the Cir-
cuit had ever advanced so far, and the second session of the 104th 
Congress might well have divided the Circuit. A split of the Circuit could 
have substantially affected the environment, public lands, natural re-
sources, the federal judicial system in the western United States, and the 
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 
The Author completed most of his work on this Article while teaching at the University of 
Montana School of Law. The Author would like to thank Peggy Sanner for valuable sugges-
tions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this Article, as well as Ann and 
Tom Boone and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. This Article is for Al 
Stone. 
1 S. 956, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995). 
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country. During March 1996, however, the sponsors of Senate Bill 956 de-
cided that they lacked the necessary votes to pass the proposal and agreed 
to a compromise which would have authorized a national commission to 
study the federal appeals courts. 2 The House of Representatives accorded 
this proposal little attention, and the 104th Congress adjourned in October 
without passing either the study commission proposal or the circuit-divid-
ing bill. 
There are several important reasons why those interested in natural 
resources and the federal courts cannot assume that the circuit-splitting 
issue is moot. First, bifurcation's proponents introduced legislation that 
would have divided the Ninth Circuit relatively soon after the 105th Con-
gress convened. 3 The first session of the 105th Congress did not pass the 
proposed legislation. However, it did authorize a study which would em-
phasize the Ninth Circuit, an analysis that has apparently become a condi-
tion precedent to serious consideration of circuit-splitting. 4 Second, the 
pressure to split the Ninth Circuit will probably build as the Circuit's 
caseload, population, and perhaps membership, continue to increase, as 
more new judges join the Circuit who are less committed to maintaining 
its current structure, and as Congress persists in authorizing additional 
judgeships and splitting circuits as solutions to docket growth. 
The remarkable quantity and quality of resources that exist within the 
Ninth Circuit also emphasize bifurcation's critical nature. For instance, a 
significant number of the country's national parks, such as Glacier, Grand 
Canyon, and Yosemite, are located within the Ninth Circuit. Moreover, nu-
merous wilderness areas, including the Frank Church River of No Return 
and the Bob Marshall Wilderness Areas, and many wildlife refuges, such as 
the Arctic and Malheur National Wildlife Refuges, are within the Circuit's 
jurisdiction. Indeed, an astounding seventy percent of the federal public 
lands in the entire United States are within the Ninth Circuit's purview.5 
Finally, division today would be inadvisable in the absence of empirical 
data clearly demonstrating that the Circuit is experiencing severe difficul-
ties and that circuit-splitting is the best solution. 
These ideas mean that the possibility of bifurcating the Ninth Circuit 
warrants analysis. This Article undertakes that effort. Part II first evalu-
ates developments relating to the circuit-dividing proposals that Congress 
explored during 1995, 1996, and 1997. Finding that the proposals acquired 
considerable momentum in the 104th Congress, Part III assesses the pros-
pects for splitting the ·circuit. Because the 105th Congress closely consid-
ered the bills sponsored by bifurcation's advocates, this Article calls for 
the collection, analysis, and synthesis of sufficiently reliable information 
to support fully informed decisionmaking and for the development of fea-
2 142 CoNG. REc. S2544-45 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murkowski (R-
Alaska)). 
3 S. 431, 105th Cong. § 11 (1997). 
4 H.R. 2267, 105th Cong. § 305 (1997). 
5 David Schaefer, Northwest Push for New Court Gains Foes, 1 Ally, SEATILE TIMES, 
Mar. 7, 1990, at B4. 
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sible alternatives to the Ninth Circuit split. These are duties which the 
recently authorized commission will ostensibly discharge. 
II. RELEVANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 104TH CONGRESS 
In May 1995, senators representing Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, 
and Washington introduced legislation which would have bifurcated the 
Ninth Circuit.6 Senator Slade Gorton CR-Wash.) and Senator Conrad Burns 
(R-Mont.) led the battle to divide the Circuit, while Senator Orrin Hatch 
(R-Utah), Chair of the Judiciary Committee, conducted a hearing on Sen-
ate Bill 956 during September of that year. 
Proponents enunciated three principal arguments in support of the 
proposal, and critics developed a number of responses as well as argu-
ments against splitting the Circuit. First, the advocates claimed that the 
Circuit's gargantuan size creates complications. 7 Those problems include 
geographic magnitude, travel and related costs, the population base 
served, the substantial complement of judges (twenty-eight), the Circuit's 
docket and concomitant time for deciding cases, and the costs of operat-
ing the Circuit. 
Critics of Senate Bill 956 offered several responses to the ideas in-
volving size. They asserted that the Circuit has instituted procedures 
which address the difficulties attributable to size.8 For example, the loca-
tion of circuit administrative units in Pasadena and Seattle,9 where ap-
peals can be orally argued, responds to the concern about the distances 
that counsel and parties must travel. Opponents also contended that great 
size is an advantage. 10 For instance, it offers economies of scale, and size 
provides considerable diversity in terms of the complexity and novelty of 
appeals and in terms of judges' race, gender, political viewpoints, and geo-
graphic origins. 
6 See S. 956 (proposing a new Twelfth Circuit comprised of Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Mon-
tana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington, and leaving California, Hawaii, Guam, and the North-
ern Mariana Islands in the Ninth Circuit). For discussions of prior proposals, see generally 
THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1994) [hereinafter RATIONING JusTICE); 
Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing. Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to Divide the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARiz. ST. 
L.J. 917 (1990) [hereinafter Redrawing Circuit Boundaries); Carl Tobias, The Impoverished 
Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357 (1995). 
7 141 CoNG. REc. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton (R-
Wash.)); 141 CONG. REc. S7505-06 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Conrad Bums 
CR-Mont)); see generally Tobias, supra note 6, at 1366-69 (discussing the impacts of geo-
graphic size on the Ninth Circuit). 
8 The Ninth Circuit Split: Hearings on S. 956 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 104th Cong. 29-31 (1995) [hereinafter S. 956 Hearings] (testimony of Chief Judge Clif-
ford Wallace, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit). 
9 Id. 
10 Id.; 0FF1CE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTNE OF THE U.S. CouRTS FOR THE NINTI1 CIRCUIT, PosI-
TION PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO s. 956-NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZA'I10N AcT m' 
1995 AND COMPANION BILL H.R. 2935, 4 (1996) [hereinafter PosmoN PAPER]. 
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Another major argument of the proposal's sponsors was that the Cir-
cuit's case law is inconsistent. 11 They observed that the statistical oppor-
tunities for conflicts are substantial because, for example, 3276 
combinations of three-judge panels might theoretically be comprised to 
address one question. 12 The Ninth Circuit Executive Office and federal 
courts experts who have evaluated Circuit decision-making have found 
minimal inconsistency.13 The Circuit has correspondingly implemented 
mechanisms to treat possible inconsistency. 14 For instance, staff attorneys 
review every case and code the issues for consideration into a computer. 15 
The Circuit then assigns to the same three-judge panel those appeals 
which raise analogous questions and are ready for resolution at the same 
time.16 · 
The third important contention of the proposal's advocates was that 
California judges, cases, and perspectives dominate the Pacific North-
west.17 This concept may reflect proponents' dissatisfaction with the 
Ninth Circuit's determinations in areas such as environmental law and nat-
ural resources. 18 Senator Conrad Burns (R-Mont.), an original cosponsor 
11 See 141 CONG. REc. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton (R-
Wash.)) (asserting that judges are unable to keep abreast of legal developments, and that the 
Circuit's legal opinions are narrow with little precedential value); see generally Tobias, 
supra note 6, at 1369-71 (presenting Sen. Mark Hatfield's (R-Or.) argument that the in-
creased caseload creates greater opportunities for inconsistency). 
12 Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 6, at 938; see also 141 CoNG. REc. S7504 
(daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton CR-Wash.)) (chronicling the Ninth 
Circuit's inconsistency). 
13 Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the Law of the Large Circuit, in 
RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND Tf!E F'uTuRE OF THE FED-
ERAL COURTS 55, 55-90 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990); Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra 
note 6, at 938-50. 
14 Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 6, at 939; see also PosmoN PAPER, supra 
note 10, at 5-6 (discussing how size has improved decisionmaking and judicial administra-
tion); Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth 
Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REV. 937, 945 (1980) (discussing the Ninth Circuit's calendaring process). 
15 Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 6, at 939. 
16 Id. 
17 See 141 CONG. REc. S7505-06 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Conrad Bums 
CR-Mont.)) (stating that California generates the majority of Ninth Circuit cases); 141 CoNG. 
REc. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton CR-Wash.)) (stating that 
California provides 55% of the Ninth Circuit case filings, and that the Ninth Circuit is domi-
nated by California judges and judicial philosophies); see generally Tobias, supra note 6, at 
1371-73 (quoting statements of Sen. Slade Gorton (R-Wash.), Sen. Conrad Bums CR-Mont.), 
and Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-Or.)). 
18 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997) (reversing Ninth Circuit decision that 
held that farmers and irrigation district did not have standing to file a citizen suit under the 
Endangered Species Act); Meghrig v. KFC Western, lnc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996) (reversing Ninth 
Circuit decision that held citizen suit provision of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
authorized cause of action to recover the cost of prior clean up of toxic waste site that no 
longer posed a threat to health or the environment); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen 
Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989) (reversing Ninth Circuit decision that upheld citizen group chal-
lenge to Forest Service issuance of a special use permit); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 
U.S. 531 (1987) (reversing Ninth Circuit decision granting a preliminary injunction against a 
Department of Interior sale of oil and gas leases). 
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of the proposed legislation, claimed that a significant reason for its intro-
duction was an increase in litigation against economic activities, such as 
timber and mining, which jeopardizes local economic stability.19 Senator 
Burns subsequently stated that the current Ninth Circuit deprives states 
which rely heavily on resource management the opportunity to have 
judges who might be more sensitive to local needs decide appeals impli-
cating environmental issues.20 Other proponents of Senate Bill 956, how-
ever, have specifically disclaimed these ideas. The Senate Committee 
Report (Report) attending the bill expressly disavowed discontent with 
the Circuit's decisions in the natural resources field as a proper basis for 
splitting the Circuit, even as the Report recognized that some sponsors 
had evinced this concern.21 
Numerous opponents of dividing the Circuit denominated the bifurca-
tion effort as environmental gerrymandering, claiming that Senate Bill 956 
proponents were attempting to establish a new Twelfth Circuit which 
would be more responsive to the development of natural resources and 
suggesting that the preferable way to realize substantive legal change is by 
convincing Congress to alter the applicable· laws.22 Critics have corre-
spondingly challenged the sponsors' basic notion that the Circuit's judges 
who sit in California are idiosyncratic and identical. 23 Analysis of the 
judges' philosophies and the computerized, random selection of panels un-
dermine efforts to stereotype those Circuit members from California. 24 
Opponents of the circuit-split proposal also claimed that the Circuit's rec-
ord in resolving environment disputes was relatively neutral. 25 
Several additional contentions favored circuit-splitting. Advocates of 
bifurcation argued that members of a smaller circuit, such as the projected 
Twelfth Circuit (which would have thirteen judges) would be more colle-
gial, thus improving efficiency. 26 This idea could be correct, even though 
\'i 19 Conrad Burns, Gorton-Burns Bill Would Split the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals; 
Burns to Hold Up Judicial Nominations Until Bill is Approved (May 25, 1995) (press release, 
on file with author). 
20 Neil A Lewis, Partisan Gridlock Blocks Senate Confirmation of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 29, 1995, at A16; see NINTH CmcmT CoURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION AcT OF 1995, S. 
REP. No. 104-197, at 26 (1995) (disagreeing with Sen. Conrad Bums' CR-Mont.) view that the 
Circuit should be divided in order to accommodate regional interests). 
21 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8-9. 
22 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 26-27; see also Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization 
Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong. 284 (1990) [hereinafter S. 948 Hearings] (testi-
mony of Sen. Pete Wilson CR-Cal.)) (providing earlier accusation of environmental 
gerrymandering). 
23 S. 948 Hearings, supra note 22, at 284-85 (testimony of Sen. Pete Wilson (R-Cal.)); 
Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 6, at 941; Tobias, supra note 6, at 1372. 
24 S. 948 Hearings, supra note 22, at 284-85 (testimony of Sen. Pete Wilson (R-Cal.)). 
25 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 27; see infra Part III (specifying the breakdown of Ninth Circuit 
opinions that were "pro-environment" and "con-environment"). 
26 Tobias, supra note 6, at 1385-86; see generally FRANK M. CoFF1N, ON APPEAL: CouRTs, 
LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 213-29 (1994) (stressing the importance of collegiality within a 
court to quality judicial work and describing how a court can achieve and maintain 
collegiality). 
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familiarity might also foster deleterious routinization and could even lead 
to strong disagreements. Critics of circuit-splitting contended that the pro-
posed, smaller Ninth Circuit would have a significantly less advantageous 
ratio of three-judge panels to cases than the new Twelfth Circuit and a 
considerably less beneficial ratio than the current Ninth Circuit.27 Critics 
also claimed that the proposed Twelfth Circuit would impose substantial 
administrative costs, essentially replicating functions which the existing 
Ninth Circuit was already performing effectively.28 They argued that bifur-
cating the Circuit would fragment the Circuit's unified construction of fed-
eral environmental and natural resources law which it has enforced 
consistently in the West and across ecosystems that span the political 
boundaries of the two proposed circuits. 29 
In autumn 1995, the sponsors of Senate Bill 956 conducted discus-
sions with some Judiciary Committee members and a few senators from 
states which the Ninth Circuit's bifurcation would have affected.30 Arizona 
apparently assumed significance for Senate Bill 956 champions who con-
sidered the Committee vote of Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) important, and 
the state's docket, population, and Ninth Circuit judges valuable in secur-
ing felicitous division. The advocates had first explored the possibility of 
placing Arizona in the Tenth Circuit, but abandoned this prospect because 
it violated the tradition of not shuffling states between courts of appeal. 
In a December 1995 Senate Judiciary Committee markup session, the 
Committee agreed on an amendment which placed Arizona and Nevada in 
the proposed Twelfth Circuit, authorized thirteen judges for that Circuit, 
and located its headquarters in Phoenix. 31 Committee members, except 
for Senator Howell Heflin (D-Ala.), approved the amended proposal in an 
11-7 vote along party lines.32 Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) vocifer-
ously fought the amendment for several reasons. 33 Most important many 
advantages which the new Twelfth Circuit would have attained would 
have been at the expense of the proposed Ninth Circuit. For example, the 
proposed Ninth Circuit would have had a detrimental ratio of three-judge 
panels to cases and would essentially have been a one-state circuit. Sena-
27 Pos1T10N PAPER, supra note 10, at 3; S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 29-31 (testi-
mony of Chief Judge Clifford Wallace). ' 
28 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 24-25; Pos1TI0N PAPER, supra note 10, at 4. 
29 S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 30 (testimony of Chief Judge Clifford Wallace); 
Pos1T10N PAPER, supra note 10, at 5; see S. 948 Hearings, supra note 22, at 508 (testimony of 
Michael Traynor, Chair, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund) (affording earlier expression of 
idea); S. 948 Hearings, supra note 22, at 285 (statement of Sen. Pete Wilson (R-Cal.)) 
(same). 
30 See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 5-6 (summarizing the hearing on September 13, 1995). 
31 S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); Hearings on Markup of S. 956 Before the Senate Judiciary 
Comm., 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter Markup Hearjngs]; Adrianne Flynn, Senate Panel 
OKs New Appeals Court; Circuit Would be Based in Phoenix, Amz. REPUBLIC, Dec. 8, 1995, 
at Bl. 
32 Markup Hearings, supra note 31; S. REP. No. 104-197, at 6; Flynn, supra note 31. 
33 Markup Hearings, supra note 31; S. REP. No. 104-197, at 19-20, 29-31 (Sen. Feinsten 
(D~Cal.) argued the amendment was a political move that amounted to judicial gerrymander-
ing); Flynn, supra note 31. 
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tor Feinstein offered an amendment which would have authorized a na-
tional commission to evaluate the structure of the appellate courts;34 
however, the Committee rejected her proposal by one vote.35 
The day before the Committee markup, Governor Pete Wilson (R-
Cal.) wrote Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) to register his vigorous opposi-
tion to any bifurcation of the Ninth Circuit until an objective assessment 
of the Circuit was concluded. He observed that the division would pro-
mote inconsistency along the West Coast in specific areas, such as natural 
resources law.36 Chief Judge Clifford Wallace contacted the one hundred 
senators to state why the Circuit Judicial Council and practically all of the 
Circuit's active judges wanted the Circuit kept intact and to request that 
Congress authorize an evaluation of the appellate system. 37 Ninth Circuit 
Judge Charles Wiggins wrote Senator Feinstein to express his strong op-
position to Senate Bill 956, to encourage the Senator to fight the proposal 
on the floor, and to call for a national study commission.38 
During March 1996, the champions of Senate Bill 956 attempted to 
have the Senate consider the bill in the context of federal courts appropri-
ations legislation.39 Much substantive debate on the proposed division's 
merits ensued; however, the bill's advocates concluded that they lacked 
the requisite votes to pass it. Proponents, therefore, agreed to a proposal 
for creating a national study commission which passed easily with biparti-
san support. 40 The proposal was assigned to the House Subcommittee on 
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, which Representative 
Carlos Moorhead (R-Cal.) chaired. The proposal for a national committee 
remained in that subcommittee until September, when several senators 
threatened to attach the study commission proposal to court appropria-
tions legislation, and this led Representative Moorhead to move the propo-
sal out of his subcommittee. However, Congress adjourned before both 
Houses could consider the study commission, although it did appropriate 
$500,000 for a study. 
In short, individuals and entities interested in the environment, public 
lands, and natural resources, as well as the federal courts in the West, 
closely tracked legislative developments relating to Senate Bill 956 during 
the 104th Congress. The proposal's passage might have substantially af-
fected environmental resources as well as the federal, civil, and criminal 
34 Markup Hearings, supra note 31. 
35 Id. 
36 Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Chair-
man, U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm. (Dec. 6, 1995) (on file with author). 
37 Letter from Chief Judge Clifford Wallace, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
to Sen. Spencer Abraham (R-Mich.) (Dec. 21, 1995) (on file with author); see S. REP. No. 104-
197, at 6 (suggesting need for a study of the appellate system). 
38 S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 107 (testimony of Sen. Howell Heflin (D-Ala.)) (sug-
gesting need for "careful evaluation of the entire circuit court structure"); Letter from Judge 
Charles E. Wiggins, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-
Cal.) (Dec. 18, 1995) (on file with author). 
39 142 CONG. REc. S2219-303 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996); see Carl Tobias, A Proposal to 
Study the Federal Appellate System, 167 F.R.D. 275, 279 (1996) (analysis of Senate Bill 956). 
40 142 CoNG. REc. S2544-45 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996). 
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justice systems. In the end, Congress did not split the Ninth Circuit or 
approve a study commission. 
III. PROSPECTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DIVISION 
Members of Congress who favor division of the Ninth Circuit intro-
duced a circuit-splitting proposal again in the 105th Congress. 41 Once 
more, the three principal reasons articulated by advocates of bifurcation 
were the Circuit's enormous size, inconsistency of the Circuit's case law, 
and California's dominance of the Circuit. These justifications were at 
least as applicable at the outset of the 105th Congress as they were during 
the 104th Congress. 42 Indeed; champions of circuit-splitting contended 
that certain aspects of the Circuit's operations had deteriorated since 
1995. 
Proponents of the split argued that the number of individuals whom 
the Circuit serves as well as the size of the Circuit's caseload have contin-
ued to grow and will increase in the future, while the Circuit had reduced 
only minimally the time which it requires for resolving appeals. 43 Oppo-
nents of circuit-splitting could have responded by showing that the Circuit 
had improved its disposition of appeals in terms of several parameters, 
such as the speed with which judges write opinions once the cases are in 
their hands.44 Critics might also have observed that the Circuit could have 
significantly expedited appellate dispositions had it been operating with 
the full complement of active judges authorized. 45 Indeed, one argument 
against the proposed split is that the Circuit could resolve appeals much 
more promptly if the nine additional judges whom the Judicial Conference 
has requested were authorized and appointed. 46 Of course, if this occurred 
41 S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997). 
42 See supra notes 7-25 and accompanying text (articulating reasons given for splitting 
the Circuit during the 104th Congress); see generally Tobias, supra note 6, at 1366-73 (dis-
cussing the arguments for bifurcation, including size, inconsistency, and California's 
dominance). 
43 143 CoNG. REc. S1104 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1997) (statement of Sen. Conrad Bums (R-
Mont.)); see S. REP. No. 104-197, supra note 20, at 9-10 (discussing how the Ninth Circuit's 
size has contributed to delay in processing cases); 141 CoNG. REc. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 
1995) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton CR-Wash.)) (stating that the Ninth Circuit is the fastest 
growing circuit, and that caseloads are becoming larger). 
44 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 28; POSITION PAPER, supra note 10, at 7; see also S. 956 Hear-
ings, supra note 8, at 32 (testimony of Chief Judge Clifford Wallace) (stating out that the 
Ninth Circuit is the second most efficient court in deciding the cases once they are submit-
ted to the judges). 
45 See Pos1T10N PAPER, supra note 10, at 7 (arguing that the median time of disposition is 
unlikely to improve substantially until the court is staffed with its full complement of 
judges); see also S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 32 (testimony of Chief Judge Clifford 
Wallace) (same). During much of 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals experienced va-
cancies in ten of its twenty-eight authorized judgeships. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE 1997 
YEAR-END REPORT O~' THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1997). 
46 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ACTS ON CAMERAS IN COURT 
(1996); Tobias, supra note 6, at 1411; see S. REP. No. 104-197, at 6 (pointing out that the issue 
to split the Ninth Circuit presents an immediacy not evident with respect to other circuits 
because the Ninth Circuit has requested an additional ten judges). 
1998] NINTH CIRCUIT SPLIT 419 
and the number of authorized judges increased to thirty-seven, circuit-
splitting advocates might have made a stronger argument that the large 
judicial complement complicates the Circuit's management and, thus, 
compels bifurcation. 
The other two major contentions advanced by supporters of the Ninth 
Circuit split, growing inconsistency in Circuit case law and California's 
dominance of the Circuit, seem less persuasive than the arguments relat-
ing to size.47 In fact, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved Senate Bill 
956, even though considerable information suggested that intracircuit con-
flicts were not a serious problem and that California's dominance was not 
evident from analysis of the Circuit's environmental opinions.48 For in-
stance, Professor Arthur Hellman, who has studied the Ninth Circuit more 
than any other legal academician, testified that evaluation of the Ninth 
Circuit precedent indicated minimal inconsistency. 49 Senator Dianne Fein-
stein (D-Cal.) and Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) correspondingly 
found that an assessment of 129 recent opinions in the environmental area 
yielded 64 which were "pro-environment" and 65 which were "con-envi-
ronment. "50 The Senate Committee Report concomitantly rejected dissat-
isfaction with the Circuit's decision-making in the natural resources field 
as an appropriate reason for bifurcation. 51 
Certain factors examined above suggest that pressure to split the 
Ninth Circuit will continue increasing. For example, if nine more judges 
for the Circuit were authorized and appointed, a contingent of judges 
which exceeds by twenty the complement on the next largest circuit (the 
Fifth Circuit), the Ninth Circuit's size would afford proponents of bifurca-
tion a strong argument. 52 Thirty-seven judges could exacerbate the admin-
istrative problems of a circuit which may already be the most difficult 
circuit to manage. Moreover, expanding the Circuit's membership by nine 
47 See supra notes 11-25 and accompanying text (discussing these contentions in detail). 
48 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 9-10. But see supra notes 11-25 (discussing the potential for 
inconsistency and California's role in the Circuit). 
49 S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 107. 
50 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 27; see supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text (discussing 
arguments of proponents of Senate Bill 956 that the Ninth Circuit be more responsive to the 
development of natural resources and arguments of opponents that the environmental rec-
ord is relatively neutral). But see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (discussing the 
view that the Pacific Northwest's needs are underrepresented). 
51 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 27; see also infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text (arguing 
that political reasons such as attempting to secure court opinions favorable to the develop-
ment of natural resources are inappropriate reasons for splitting the Circuit). 
52 S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 72 (testimony of Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid F. 
O'Scannlain); see supra note 46 and accompanying text (pointing out that increasing the 
number of judges may complicate the Circuit's management); see also supra note 26 and 
accompanying text (presenting the argument of circuit split proponents that a small court is 
more collegial). But see supra Part II (suggesting potential problems with familiarity be-
tween judges). The Fifth Circuit has seventeen judges. 
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judges may multiply the statistical opportunities for conflicting opinions 
which the Circuit's critics already contend are significant. 53 
Even if Congress does not authorize additional positions for the Ninth 
Circuit, numerous judges will join the Circuit as replacements for mem-
bers who assume senior status or resign. The future appointees will proba-
bly be less concerned about keeping the Circuit intact than the Circuit's 
members have historically been. Indeed, prior to the 104th Congress, no 
judge of the Ninth Circuit had publicly stated that the division was advisa-
ble.54 New appointees, who are not steeped in the Circuit's traditions, may 
simply be less committed to maintaining it's century-old structure. 
Pressure to bifurcate the Circuit also will continue to build until the 
focus shifts to treating caseload increases rather than authorizing addi-
tional judgeships and dividing appellate courts. 55 There are numerous 
structural and non-structural approaches besides adding judges and divid-
ing circuits which may respond more effectively to mounting dockets. For 
example, Congress might restrict civil or criminal jurisdiction, create sub-
ject matter courts, or limit the right of appeal. 56 
The Senate Committee Report accompanying the proposal that the 
Judiciary Committee approved apparently summarized and epitomized the 
views that increasing numbers of judges and congressional members will 
probably hold regarding the Ninth Circuit. The Report found that the Cir-
cuit "stands well apart from the other Federal judicial circuits and remains 
in a unique position. . . . [as] by far the largest court of appeals in the 
Federal system by any measure. "57 The Report correspondingly asserted 
that "no other circuit presents anywhere near as compelling a case for 
being split" and that the Circuit's request for ten additional judges gave 
circuit-splitting an immediacy which was not evident for any other 
circuit.58 
In short, the 104th Congress seriously considered bifurcating the 
Ninth Circuit; the 105th Congress devoted some attention to the prospect 
and even could have split the Circuit. However, Congress decided instead 
to authorize a commission that will study the appellate courts, In any 
53 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting that 3,276 combinations of three-
judge panels are possible). But cf supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (finding mini-
mal inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit's decisions). 
54 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8, 20. Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain suggested in testimony at the 
Senate hearing that he considered division appropriate and inevitable, but not imminent. See 
S. 956 Hearings, supra note 8, at 69-71 (testimony of Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain) ("I am 
convinced that it is inevitable that the [N]inth [C]ircuit be split and that the time for that 
split, while not yet iinminent, may well be fast approaching."). 
55 Tobias, supra note 6, at 1386-95; see S. REP. No. 104-197, at 18 (arguing that adequate 
and timely information is needed to find a better solution). 
56 For a thorough analysis of these and numerous other options see RATIONING Jus11cE, 
supra note 6, at 106-286. See a/,so infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (discussing the 
creation of a court with national subject matter jurisdiction over appeals concerning envi-
ronmental, public lands, and natural resources law). 
57 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 6. 
58 Id.; see supra notes 46, 52 and accompanying text (arguing that adding judges may 
make it easier to resolve appeals but suggesting that proponents of bifurcation might then 
have a stronger argument). 
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event, pressure to divide the Ninth Circuit will only grow over the near 
term, and Congress probably will bifurcate the Circuit during the next dec-
ade. Part IV, therefore, explores potential responses to the possibility of 
bifurcation. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FoR THE F'uTIJRE 
Recommendations for the future warrant relatively brief examination 
in this. Article because many broad suggestions regarding the appellate 
system and the Ninth Circuit have been afforded elsewhere.59 However, 
recommendations relating specifically to the Circuit and natural resources 
are rather difficult to formulate without better information on the Circuit 
and the entire appellate system. Nevertheless, it is possible to provide 
some general and particular ideas. 
A. General Suggestions 
1. Caseload Growth and the Appellate System 
Numerous experts and institutions which have analyzed the appeals 
courts believe that the traditional congressional approach of approving ad-
ditional judgeships and splitting circuits is ineffective and outmoded, espe-
cially as a solution to multiplying dockets. 6° For instance, dividing the 
courts only redistributes, rather than diminishes, caseload, which is the 
real problem that the circuits face. 61 Splitting circuits also irrevocably de-
creases the circuits' federalizing responsibility to harmonize the Constitu-
tion and national policy concerns with state and local policies, thereby 
reducing their role as national courts. 62 
59 See, e.g., RATIONING JusTicE, supra note 6, at 106-286 (discussing past, present, and 
future internal and external reforms of the.federal courts of appeals); Tobias, supra note 6, 
at 1395-1415 (discussing solutions to the problems of docket growth, time needed to resolve 
appeals, and the large number of new judges needed in the Ninth Circuit); supra notes 36-38 
and accompanying text (discussing the proposal to evaluate the appellate system). 
60 See, e.g., RATIONING JusTicE, supra note 6, at 99-105 (presenting the argument for a 
moratorium on dividing the Ninth Circuit); Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a 
Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 11, 45-49, 55-57 (discussing the 
impact of adding more judges and adjusting the Circuit structure); see also CoMM. ON LONG 
RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TIIE U. S., LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR TIIE FEDERAL 
CoURTS 44-45 (1995) [hereinafter LoNG RANGE PLAN] (recommending circuit restructuring 
only if compelling empirical evidence demonstrates adjudicative or administrative dysfunc-
tion in a court so that it cannot continue to deliver quality justice and coherent, consistent 
circuit law). 
61 See, e.g., Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 6, at 948 (referring to a detailed 
study of the omnibus judgeship statute which found only a one year impact on the appeals-
per-panel ratio); Alfred T. Goodwin, Splitting the Ninth Circuit - No Answer to Caseload 
Growth, OR. ST. B. BuLL., Jan. 1990, at 10-11 (predicting that the number of cases that must 
be heard by three-judge panels nationwide would remain the same and continue to grow no 
matter how many new circuits are formed); Patrick Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-The Carci-
noma of the Federal Judiciary, 31 ALA. L. REv. 261, 270 (1980) (seeing an increase in judges 
as the last resort and certainly not an option before discarding diversity jurisdiction). 
62 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 10-13 (5th ed. 1994); John M. Wis-
dom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LoY. L. REv. 787, 788 (1980); see also infra note 76 and 
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There is an imperfect understanding of the precise effects of mount-
ing appeals and of many other phenomena which affect the modem apP.el-
late court system and specific regional circuits. 63 This lack of 
comprehension correspondingly complicates efforts to formulate effica-
cious solutions to those difficulties that the courts are currently exper-
iencing. Indeed, no thorough evaluation of the entire system or even 
individual courts has been conducted since the 1973 report of the Com-
mission on the Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (Hruska 
Commission Study).64 
The lack of reliable information about the gravest problems con-
fronting the circuits and effective remedies for these problems has numer-
ous important consequences. Most significant, the lack of information 
leaves unclear the wisdom of applying various approaches and means that 
the implementation of many apparent solutions, including a particular cir-
cuit's division, could prove misguided. For example, it would be unfortu-
nate to split the Ninth Circuit today, possibly committing the nation to an 
irretrievable course of action, only to learn subsequently that a different 
remedy would have been preferable for the Ninth Circuit or the country. 
These ideas suggest that it was appropriate for Congress to authorize 
a national study commission.65 The Commission's purpose is to "study the 
present division of the United States into the several judicial circuits [and] 
the structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals system, with 
particular reference to the Ninth Circuit," for ten months and two months 
thereafter, the Commission must report "recommendations for such 
changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the 
accompanying text (arguing that a circuit not be divided to support regional interests be-
cause doing so would be the antithesis of the federalizing function). 
63 See RATIONING JusTicE, supra note 6, at 31-51 (discussing the crisis of volume); Carl 
Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CoRNELL L. REv. 
1264 (1996) (discussing whether increases in appellate filings have transformed the Ninth 
Circuit and whether an increase in judgeships will solve the problem); see also Dragich, 
supra note 60, at 25-28 (discussing current conditions in the Federal Courts of Appeals). 
64 COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES 
OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973) 
[hereinafter HRUSKA COMMISSION); see also S. REP. No. 104-197, supra note 20, at 3-4, 16-17 
(presenting the view that the fundamental problem of circuit realignment is the lack of data 
and that a study commission like the Hruska Commission should be formed); infra note 72 
and accompanying text (pointing out that the last study done was by the Hruska Commis-
sion in 1973). 
65 In mid-November, a House-Senate Conference Committee agreed on a compromise 
which authorized a five-member study commission appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist to 
study the issue for ten months. H.R. 2267, 105th Cong. § 305 (1997). Congress initially had 
been considering two study commission proposals. One proposal called for a report to be 
completed in two years. S. 248, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 908, 105th Cong. (1997). The other 
proposed that a report be returned within one year, or by June 30, 1998. S. 283, 105th Cong. 
(1997); H.R. 639, 105th Cong. (1997). The House passed House Bill 908 in June, which au-
thorized a report to be completed within eighteen months. 143 CoNG. REc. H3223-25 (daily 
ed. June 3, 1997) (statement of Sen. Howard Coble (R-N.C.)) (passed by a voice vote with 
two-thirds in favor of the bill). However, in July, the Senate passed an appropriations rider 
that would have split the Ninth Circuit. See S. 1022, 105th Cong. § 305 (1997) (passed by a 
vote of 55 to 45). 
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expeditious and effective disposition of the caseload of the federal Courts 
of Appeal, consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due 
process. "66 
2. The Ninth Circuit 
Much of the above also applies to the Ninth Circuit. Perhaps most 
importantly, the Circuit may not be experiencing difficulties that are suffi-
ciently problematic to require treatment, especially with solutions which 
are as radical, potentially ineffective, and irrevocable as circuit-splitting. 
Even if it were clear that the Circuit is facing complications which are 
troubling enough to warrant remediation with circuit-splitting, bifurcation 
may be inadvisable primarily because California's size apparently pre-
cludes workable division.67 For instance, the realignment that Senate Bill 
956 proposed would have created a sprawling Twelfth Circuit, dubbed the 
"stringbean circuit," and would have left an unprecedented two-state 
Ninth Circuit comprised of only California and Hawaii.68 Unless Congress 
authorizes three courts of appeal, the only way in which Congress can 
evenly split the Circuit caseload is by bifurcating California and by as-
signing the state's four federal districts to different appellate courts.69 This 
solution would also be unprecedented and could be problematic70 be-
cause the two new circuits might interpret California law differently. 71 
In short, there is currently inadequate information on many relevant 
phenomena that affect the Ninth Circuit, particularly docket growth. The 
1973 Hruska Commission study constituted the last comprehensive analy-
sis of the Circuit. 72 This dearth of reliable material seriously complicates 
efforts to evaluate the desirability of changes in the Circuit and the effi-
cacy of proposed remedies, especially ones that are as potentially far-
reaching as division. These propositions show the need for a thorough 
66 H.R. 2267. 
67 Tobias, supra note 6, at 1409-15. 
68 S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); S. REP. No. 104-197, at 7, 29-30 (1995); HRUSKA CoMM1ss10N, 
supra note 64, at 237 (discussing disadvantages of Circuit dominated by California). The 
appropriations rider that the Senate passed in the 105th Congress would have left California 
and Nevada in the Ninth Circuit and would have placed the remaining states and territories 
in the proposed Twelfth Circuit. S. 1022, supra note 65. 
69 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 5-7; HRUSKA CoMM1ss10N, supra note 64, at 238-39; S. 956 Hear-
ings, supra note 8, at 69-71 (testimony of Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain); see generally Arthur 
D. Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1188 (1974) (exploring the consequences of dividing California between two cir-
cuits and mechanisms for avoiding or resolving conflicts). 
70 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 7; Tobias, supra note 6, at 1413. But see HRUSKA CoMM1ss10N, 
supra note 64, at 238-39 (asserting that the dividing of judicial districts of California be-
tween two circuits raises no insolvable or unmanageable problems); Hellman, supra note 
69, at 1281 (admitting that none of the conflicts that are likely to arise in the divided state 
situations are unique). 
71 HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 64, at 238-39. 
72 More recent, but considerably less comprehensive, studies are the LoNG RANGE PLAN, 
supra note 60; JUDITH A McKENNA, FEDERAL JumcIAL CENTER, STRuCTIJRAL AND OTHER ALTER-
NATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (1993); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STIJDY 
CoMM. (1990) (hereinafter FEDERAL CouRTS REPORT]. 
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assessment of the Ninth Circuit, the difficulties that it is now confronting 
and will experience in the future, and developing solutions to those com-
plications. The study should focus on problems that are attributable to 
increasing appeals and solutions to these problems. The analysis of the 
Circuit ought to be part of, or be coordinated with, a broader examination 
of the appellate system. 73 If bifurcation is indicated, evaluators should at-
tempt to designate the preferable division, while they must remember that 
no feasible method for reconfiguring the Ninth Circuit has yet been 
devised. 
B. Suggestions Relating More Specifically to Natural Resources 
1. Political Factors 
The desire to secure appellate court rulings which are more favorable 
to interests that would develop natural resources is an inappropriate basis 
on which to premise circuit-splitting. Indeed, the Senate Committee Re-
port, which accompanied Senate Bill 956 and was ostensibly prepared as 
an advocacy document for bifurcating the Circuit, expressly and compre-
hensively delineated the reasons why the Judiciary Committee considered 
this motivation improper. 
The Report first observed that "some proponents of a [Ninth Circuit] 
division have indicated support for splitting the Circuit based on outcomes 
in certain cases or on a perceived liberal bias on the part of California 
judges ... [and] [f]requently cited ... environmental cases affecting the 
northwest States."74 The Report next proclaimed that "[t]he committee 
does not support a split of the [N]inth [C]ircuit on those bases."75 The 
Report relied upon the testimony of then Chief Judge Wallace at the Sen-
ate Bill 956 Committee Hearing who stated that division of a "circuit in 
order to accommodate a regional interest is the antithesis of the federaliz-
ing function," and the contention of Senators Joseph Biden, Jr. (D-Del.) 
and Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) that a "split on such grounds would amount 
to insupportable political 'gerrymandering.' "76 
The Report further stated: 
Although a number of parties have registered their dissatisfaction with certain 
environmental and other decisions of the [N]inth [C]ircuit, the committee finds 
such dissatisfaction an improper rationale for splitting the [C]ircuit [and] does 
73 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (explaining that House Bill 2267 directs the 
Commission to study the structure and alignment of the federal circuits in general with 
particular reference to the Ninth Circuit). 
74 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8; see supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text (discussing the 
argument that the Ninth Circuit should be split because of insensitivity to local needs in 
deciding environmental issues and the counter-argument that those critical of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decisions should change the substantive laws and not restructure the court). 
75 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8, 25-27 (asserting that regionalism and ideology play no part in 
the drawing of circuit boundaries). 
76 Id., at 8; see supra notes 29, 62 and accompanying text (stressing the importance of a 
unified construction of federal environmental and natural resources law within the Ninth 
Circuit) 
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not support altering circuit boundaries in order to achieve a given ideological 
outcome on the merits in any case or to benefit any regional interest. 77 
The Committee was also "highly skeptical as a practical matter as to 
whether any significant ideological shift in appellate decisions could be 
achieved through a circuit split. "78 The Report found that the "philosophi-
cal tendencies of a particular judge are far more likely to be aligned with 
the President who appointed that judge than the State from which the 
judge came"79 and that the precedent of the former Ninth Circuit would 
probably have bound the proposed Twelfth Circuit.80 The Report con-
cluded by characterizing as "questionable" the "propriety of considering 
the judicial philosophies and resulting opinions of particular judges or re-
gions when examining· circuit boundaries. "81 
During earlier 1990 hearings on a bill to split the Ninth Circuit, Sena-
tor Mark Hatfield (R-Or.) suggested that establishing a new Twelfth Circuit 
comprised of the five Pacific Northwest jurisdictions would honor Con-
gress's original intent when drawing appellate boundaries-to create cir-
cuits reflecting a regional identity by combining a "small set of contiguous 
states that shared a common background. "82 This idea might also support 
appellate court reconfiguration whereby current Ninth Circuit districts, 
such as Idaho and Montana, and present Tenth Circuit districts, such as 
Colorado, Utah and Wyoming, all of which are located in the intermoun-
tain West, could become part of the same appellate court. 
Several propositions, more compelling than these concepts, also es-
sentially derive from the notion of regionalism. First, basing an appellate 
court's creation. in 1998 on the aspiration to implement Congress's cen-
tury-old intent when delineating circuit boundaries appears outmoded. 83 
Indeed, it seems preferable to rely upon the idea of diversity, definable in 
terms of geographical, political, environmental or demographic differ-
ences, when constituting modern courts of appeal in a culture that relies 
on "law as the adhesive force binding a diverse population together."84 
77 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8. The Committee expressed its "hope that the court of appeals 
will reach correct decisions on the Jaw" and its view that "litigants are entitled to a full, fair, 
and expeditious determination of the merits of their case .... [but] [t]hey are not entitled to 
a given result." Id. 
78 Id. 
79 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8-9. Sen. Jon Kyl CR-Ariz.) stated that "when we look at 
predictors of how a judge might rule, it is a far greater predictor as to who appointed that 
judge than the region of the country from which the judge comes." Id. 
80 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 9; see also Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 
1981) (holding that the new Eleventh Circuit is bound by precedent of the former Fifth 
Circuit); see generally Thomas E. Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Di-
vided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687 (1981) (discussing the 1980 split of the former Fifth 
Circuit and correctly predicting that the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits would be bound by 
the precedent of the former Fifth Circuit). 
81 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 9. 
82 S. 948 Hearings, supra note 22, at 252 (testimony of Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-Or.)). 
83 Tobias, supra note 6, at 1372. 
84 Paul D. Carrington, A Nrm; Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 
DuKE L.J. 929, 940 (1996); see also Dragich, supra note 60, at 35-39 (noting society's expecta-
tion and need for uniform laws throughout the country); see generally MARTHA MINow, MAK-
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To the extent that regional factors might have applicability in particu-
lar cases, district judges arguably can examine the considerations. 85 In ap-
pellate courts, the locales where judges are stationed ought to be 
irrelevant. The circuits also have an important federalizing responsibil-
ity. 86 In short, local favoritism offends the essence of an appeals court, 
and the fragmentation of national law contravenes principles of federal-
ism87 while political factors are rarely satisfactory premises for federal 
court policy making as significant as circuit-splitting. 88 
2. Environmental Factors 
Congress must insure that substantial, valid empirical data conclu-
sively demonstrate that docket growth and other phenomena affecting the 
Ninth Circuit are troubling enough to warrant treatment and that division 
is the optimal solution before implementing this remedy. Nevertheless, bi-
furcation may be inevitable because other concerns, particularly political 
ones, could influence the ultimate determination. For example, most sena-
tors who represent the states of the Pacific Northwest possess rather con-
servative political views, especially regarding natural resources, and may 
continue to favor a split of the Ninth Circuit. 89 Political considerations 
should not dictate legislative policymaking with respect to the federal 
courts. However, there is a limited sphere, which even Article III of the 
Constitution recognizes, where appropriate political factors can operate. 90 
ING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw (1990) (discussing 
diversity). 
85 Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 6, at 942. 
86 Id.; see supra notes 62, 76 and accompanying text (stressing the circuits' duty to har-
monize national and local policy concerns and arguing that splitting the Circuit along re-
gional interests would be the antithesis of this duty). 
87 S. 948 Hearings, supra note 22, at 287 (testimony of Sen. Pete Wilson (R-Cal.)); 
Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 6, at 942-43; SuBcoMM. TO STUDY Crncurr S1zE, 
ABA APPELLATE P1lACTICE COMM., REPORT 3 (1992); see Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, 
Less Justice: The Case Against Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 79 AB.A J., July 1993, 
at 70 (analyzing fragmentation and instability of federalism). 
88 See Cass R. Sunstein, Participation, Public Law and Venue Reform, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 
976, 997-1000 (1982) (political factors are insufficient because they are short-term, checked 
by the Supreme Court, and they already have a role in the appointment process); see also 
Tobias, supra note 6, at 1374-75 (discussing the political motivations for and against Ninth 
Circuit division in the 1989 Congress); supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text (reproduc-
ing excerpts from Senate Committee Report suggesting refusal to countenance circuit-split-
ting premised on political factors). 
89 ''War" Rhetoric is Given the Boot, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, at Al 7; see supra text 
accompanying note 6 (specifying the states represented by senators introducing legislation 
for a Ninth Circuit split); supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (describing how sena-
tors in the Pacific Northwest were dissatisfied with Ninth Circuit decisions in the area of 
environmental and natural resources law); see generally WILLIAM P. PENDLEY, WAR ON THE 
WEST: GOVERNMENT TYRANNY ON AMERICA'S GREAT FRONTIER (1995) (presenting a Westerner's 
stand against environmental regulation such as the Endangered Species Act). 
90 See supra note 89 and accompanying text (predicting that Pacific Northwest senators 
will continue to favor a Ninth Circuit split because of political considerations); see also S. 
REP. No. 104-197, at 8, 30 (recognizing independent responsibilities of Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee and Congress to oversee courts of appeal and to address difficulties identified). 
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Persons and entities that are concerned about natural resources, the 
federal judicial system in the western United States, and the country must 
think realistically and creatively about potential approaches. These indi-
viduals and organizations should develop a broad range of feasible options 
which would make sense in terms of the West's natural resources, while 
honoring important values relating to the federal courts, such as expedi-
tious, inexpensive, and fair resolution of appeals. Concerned people and 
groups may want to anticipate renewed calls for circuit-splitting by formu-
lating viable alternatives to that possibility. 
Illustrative is the creation of a court with national subject matter ju-
risdiction which would hear all appeals that involve the environment, pub-
lic lands, and natural resources.91 The District of Columbia Circuit 
effectively functions as such a tribunal when environmental, public lands, 
and natural resources statutes require or permit appeals to that court. 92 
The Federal Circuit is also a helpful, general analogue. 93 Scholars have 
specifically explored the ideas of science and environmental courts, which 
would offer certain benefits, namely specialized expertise in the substan-
tive areas being reviewed.94 Nonetheless, this type of tribunal may entail 
91 For general analyses of subject matter courts see RATIONING JusTICE, supra note 6, at 
261-69; Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 745 (1981); Daniel 
J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution Through Subject Matter Organiza-
tion, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 471 (1983). 
92 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(l) (1994) ("A petition for review of action 
of the Administrator in promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient air quality 
standard, any emission standard or requirement under section 7412 of this title, any standard 
of performance or requirement under section 7411 of this title, any standard under section 
7521 of this title (other than a standard required to be prescribed under section 752l(b)(l) of 
this title), any determination under section 752l(b)(5) of this title, any control or prohibition 
under section 7545 of this title, any standard under section 7571 of this title, any rule issued 
under section 7413, 7419, or under section 7420 of this title, or any other nationally applica-
ble regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator under this chapter 
may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia"); 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(a) (1994) ("Review of any regulation promulgated under this chapter may be had 
upon application by any interested person only in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United 
States for the District of Columbia."); see generally Sunstein, supra note 88 (discussing D.C. 
Circuit and "sagebrush venue"). 
93 See Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 41 (1994)) (creating the federal circuit); see generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The 
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1989) (discussing 
the Federal Court of Appeals' patent jurisdiction); United States Court of Appea/,s for the 
Federal Circuit Tenth Anniversary Commemorative Issue, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 559, 559-1074 
(1992) (discussing various specific subject matters in the Federal Court of Appeals, includ-
ing patent law, Indian claims, veteran claims, trademark, trade, and government contract 
decisions). 
94 FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 233-35 (Erica Dolgin et al. eds., 1974); see, e.g., James L. 
Oakes, Developments in Environmental Law, 3 ENVTL. L. REP. 50001, 50011-12 (1973) (dis-
cussing and advising against a special environmental court); Scott C. Whitney, The Case For 
Creating a Special Environmental Court System, 14 WM. & MARYL. REv. 473 (1972) (dis-
cussing the creation of a special environmental court); G.J. Zimmerman, Synergy and the 
Science Court, 38 U. TORONTO FAc. L. REv. 170 (1980) (discussing the structure, implications, 
problems, and limits of a Science Court with particular regard to Canada). 
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some disadvantages, primarily the potential for developing tunnel vision 
and for being captured by various constituencies, like regulated interests 
or specialized practitioners.95 Moreover, the federal judicial system has 
never formally employed subject matter courts in the natural resources 
field, partly because Congress and the judiciary have apparently pref erred 
general courts. 96 
If Congress restructures or bifurcates the Ninth Circuit, those con-
cerned about the treatment of natural resources and the federal courts 
may want to consider how the districts that are currently part of the Ninth 
Circuit should be realigned, particularly in terms of concepts such as eco-
systems, endangered species habitat, wildlife corridors, and river drain-
ages, or in terms of specific natural resources, such as old growth forests, 
salmon, or grizzly bears. 
Concerned persons and entities could also examine realignment in 
terms of the distribution of natural resources or perceived viewpoints of 
judges in specific districts. Elevating these considerations over additional 
important substantive factors, such as economic growth, or significant 
procedural values, including federal court access, may be shortsighted or 
counterproductive.97 Concerned individuals and organizations might also 
think about the possibility of combining certain districts in the present 
Ninth Circuit with districts in other appellate courts. For instance, the re-
sources and political perspectives in a few Ninth Circuit districts, namely 
Idaho and Montana, may resemble more closely those of several Tenth 
Circuit districts, such as Colorado and Wyoming. 98 This approach could 
create appeals courts that have larger quantities of similar resources or 
more compatible viewpoints. This approach, however, may sacrifice diver-
95 See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. 
REv. 329, 335-36 (1991) (discussing disadvantages in the context of the Commerce Court and 
the Tax Court); Meador, supra note 91, at 482-84 (discussing disadvantages such as bore-
dom and lack of intellectual challenge); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, 
Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CoRNELL 
L. REV. 273, 320 (1996) (discussing boredom, tunnel vision, and loss of prestige). 
96 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 60, at 43; Richman & Reynolds, supra note 95, at 319-20; 
see also supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing legislation that requires or per-
mits appeals of natural resources cases to D.C. Circuit). Of course, subject matter panels 
could be constituted within existing circuits. See FEDERAL CouRTS REPORT, supra note 72, at 
120-21 (discussing national subject matter courts); RATIONING JusTicE, supra note 6, at 261-
69 (same); see also Meador, supra note 91, at 477 (reporting that oil and gas appeals are 
assigned to a special panel of several judges in the Fifth Circuit who have developed exper-
tise in the area). 
97 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (stressing that political factors should 
not dictate legislative policy making with respect to the federal judiciary); see also supra 
note 84 and accompanying text (discussing diversity). 
98 For example, these states have similar landscapes, climates, and wildlife. They are 
also large, sparsely populated areas. Moreover, there is a large percentage of federally-
owned land in these states. The political views of numerous senators from these states, such 
as Alaska's Ted Stevens (R), Idaho's Larry Craig (R), and Montana's Conrad Burns (R), are 
conservative, typically embracing the growth of local economies and control over private 
lands, rather than environmental preservation and conservation. See generally PENDLEY, 
supra note 89 (presenting the ideology of senators from the West). 
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sity of resources and perspectives. 99 For example, circuit-splitting propo-
nents encountered strong resistance when they broached the prospect of 
moving Arizona to the Tenth Circuit during the 104th Congress.100 
v. CONCLUSION 
Those concerned about the environment, public lands, and natural 
resources as well as federal courts in the West and the nation should care-
fully monitor the work of the national study commission that the first ses-
sion of the 105th Congress authorized. Those concerned must think 
imaginatively and pragmatically about the proposed bifurcation of the 
Ninth Circuit. Feasible alternatives to the Circuit's division are needed. 
The 104th Congress seriously considered the proposals that the 105th Con-
gress evaluated and the Commission will now analyze. Systematic, crea-
tive anticipation would help to protect the enormous, exquisite natural 
resources of the West and honor values that are important to the federal 
judicial system. 
99 For a discussion of diversity, see .supra note 84 and accompanying text and Oakes, 
supra note 94. 
100 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing Senate Bill 956). 
